Referral C-663/24 (Streamz and Others, 9 Oct 2024)

1. Must Article 15 of Directive (EU) 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on copyright and related rights in the Digital Single Market and amending Directives 96/9/EC and 2001/29/EC be interpreted as precluding national legislation which provides for a prescribed negotiation procedure, supervised by an administrative authority whose decisions are open to challenge before a court, which may result in an obligation to remunerate press publishers for the online use of their press publications, irrespective of whether those publications have been uploaded by the press publishers themselves?

2. Must Article 15 of Directive (EU) 2019/790, cited above, read in conjunction with Articles 16, 20 and 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, be interpreted as precluding national legislation which imposes on an information society service provider a unilateral and non-reciprocal obligation to provide information vis-à-vis press publishers, concerning inter alia confidential information relating to the exploitation of press publications to be provided to press publishers, even if the press publishers themselves have uploaded the press publications, and without taking into account the profits generated by the press publishers or the level of recovery of their investment from the online use of their press publications on the platforms made available by the abovementioned provider, without providing any guarantee that the confidential information concerned will be stored in accordance with the conditions imposed by the abovementioned provider?

3. Must Article 15 of Directive (EU) 2019/790, cited above, read in conjunction with Articles 16, 20 and 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Article 15 of Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal
Market be interpreted as precluding national legislation which imposes conditions under which agreements must be concluded with each individual press publisher for the online use of its press publications, including the obligation to provide remuneration for the online use of the press publications, irrespective of whether the publications concerned were uploaded by the press publishers themselves, which covers all press publications, without making a distinction according to whether or not the content is protected by copyright or whether users can access
the publications in question in their entirety or only extracts from them, and which would have the effect of imposing an obligation to monitor closely the content published by users on the platform?

4. Must Article 1(1)(f) of Directive (EU) 2015/1535 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 September 2015 laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical regulations and of rules on Information Society services (codification) be interpreted as meaning that a provision of national law establishing an inalienable and non-transferable right to compulsory remuneration for authors and performers in the event that they have assigned their right to authorise or refuse the communication to the public of their
works or other protected subject matter by an online content-sharing service provider, which can be exercised only through compulsory collective rights management, constitutes a ‘technical regulation’ the draft of which is subject to prior notification to the Commission in accordance with the first subparagraph of Article 5(1) of Directive (EU) 2015/1535? If so, does the exception to the notification obligation provided for in Article 7(1)(a) of the same directive apply?

5. Must Article 17 of Directive (EU) 2019/790, cited above, read in conjunction with Article 3 of Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society be interpreted as precluding national legislation introducing an inalienable and non-transferable right to compulsory remuneration for authors and performers in the event that they have assigned their right to authorise or prohibit communication to the public by an online content-sharing service provider, and providing that that right to remuneration can be exercised only through a mechanism for the mandatory collective management of rights, in particular where the right of making available to the public has already been licensed to the abovementioned provider?

6. Must Article 18 of Directive (EU) 2019/790, cited above, be interpreted as precluding national legislation introducing an inalienable and non-transferable right to compulsory remuneration for authors and performers in the event that they have assigned their right to authorise or prohibit the communication to the public by an online content-sharing service provider, and providing that that right to remuneration can be exercised only through a mechanism for the mandatory collective management of rights?

7. Must Article 56 TFEU be interpreted as precluding national legislation providing, without a transitional period, for an inalienable and non-transferable right to compulsory remuneration for authors and performers in the event that the latter have assigned their right to authorise or prohibit communication to the public by an online content-sharing service provider, and providing that that right to remuneration can be exercised only through a mechanism for the mandatory collective management of rights, in particular where the right of making available
to the public has already been licensed to the abovementioned provider?

8. Must Article 16 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, whether or not read in conjunction with Articles 20 and 21 of that Charter, be interpreted as precluding national legislation providing for an inalienable and non-transferable right to compulsory remuneration for authors and performers in the event that they have assigned their right to authorise or prohibit the communication to the public by an online content-sharing service provider, and providing that that right to remuneration can be exercised only through a
mechanism for the mandatory collective management of rights?

9. Must Article 1(1)(f) of Directive (EU) 2015/1535, cited above, be interpreted as meaning that a provision of national law establishing an inalienable and non-transferable right to compulsory remuneration for authors and performers of a sound or audiovisual work, which can be exercised only through compulsory collective rights management, in the event that they have assigned their right to authorise or refuse the communication to the public of their works or other protected subject matter by a streaming service provider, constitutes a ‘technical
regulation’, namely a ‘rule on services’ within the meaning of that provision, the draft of which is subject to prior notification to the Commission under the first subparagraph of Article 5(1) of that directive and, if so, does the exception to the notification obligation provided for in Article 7(1)(a) of the same directive apply?

In the context of this question, ‘streaming service provider’ should be understood as an information society service provider which has at least one of its principal objectives being to offer for profit a large quantity of sound or audiovisual works protected by copyright or related rights, the users of which have a right to accessthe abovementioned works from wherever and whenever they individually choose, it being understood that those users may not acquire a permanent reproduction of the work accessed and that the provider has editorial responsibility for the provision and the organisation of the service, including the organisation, classification and promotion of the works concerned.

10. Must Article 18 of Directive (EU) 2019/790, cited above, read in conjunction with Article 20 of that directive, be interpreted as precluding a provision of national law establishing an inalienable and non-transferable right to compulsory remuneration for authors and performers of a sound or audiovisual work, which can be exercised only through compulsory collective rights
management, in the event that they have assigned their right to authorise or refuse the communication to the public of their works or other protected subject matter by a streaming service provider, as defined above, in particular where the right of making available to the public has already been licensed to the abovementioned provider?

11. Must Article 56 TFEU be interpreted as precluding a provision of national law establishing an inalienable and non-transferable right to compulsory remuneration for authors and performers of a sound or audiovisual work, which can be exercised only through compulsory collective rights management, in the event that they have assigned their right to authorise or refuse the communication to the public of their works or other protected subject matter by a streaming service provider, as defined above, in particular where the right of making available to the public has already been licensed to that provider?

12. Must Article 16 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union be interpreted as precluding a provision of national law establishing an inalienable and non-transferable right to compulsory remuneration for authors and performers of a sound or audiovisual work, which can be exercised only through compulsory collective rights management, in the event that they have assigned their right to authorise or refuse the communication to the public of their works or other protected subject matter by a streaming service provider, as defined above,
in particular where the right of making available to the public has already been licensed to that provider?

13. Must Articles 3 and 5(3) of Directive 2001/29/EC, cited above, be interpreted as precluding a provision of national law establishing an inalienable and non-transferable right to compulsory remuneration for authors and performers of a sound or audiovisual work, which can be exercised only through compulsory collective rights management, in the event that they have assigned their right to authorise or refuse the communication to the public of their works or other protected subject matter by a streaming service provider, as defined above, in
particular where the right of making available to the public has already been licensed to that provider?