Referral C-663/24 (Streamz and Others, 9 Oct 2024)

[Machine translation from the referral decision]

1. Is Article 15 of Directive (EU) 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 ‘on copyright and related rights in the digital single market and amending Directives 96/9/EC and 2001/29/EC’ to be interpreted as precluding national legislation providing for a negotiation procedure which is signposted, supervised by an administrative authority whose decisions may be appealed before a court, which may result in an obligation to remunerate press publishers for the online use of their press publications, irrespective of whether those publications have been put online by the press publishers themselves?

2. Is Article 15 of Directive (EU) 2019/790, cited above, read in conjunction with Articles 16, 20 and 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, to be interpreted as precluding national legislation imposing on the provider of information society services a unilateral and non-reciprocal obligation to provide information to press publishers, in particular concerning confidential information relating to the exploitation of press publications to be provided to press publishers, even if the press publishers have themselves put the press publications online, and without taking into account the profits generated by the press publishers or the level of recovery of their investment through the online use of their press publications on the platforms made available by the aforementioned provider, and without providing any guarantee that the confidential information concerned will be kept in accordance with the conditions imposed by the aforementioned provider?

3. Is Article 15 of Directive (EU) 2019/790, cited above, read in conjunction with Articles 16, 20 and 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Article 15 of Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 ‘on certain legal aspects of information society services, and in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market’, to be interpreted as precluding national legislation which imposes conditions under which agreements with individual press publishers for the online use of their press publications must be concluded, including the obligation to provide remuneration for the online use of press publications, irrespective of whether the publications concerned have been placed online by the press publishers themselves, which covers all press publications, without making any distinction as to whether or not the content is protected by copyright or as to whether users can access the publications in question in their entirety or only extracts therefrom, and which has the effect of imposing an obligation to monitor closely the content published by users on the platform?

4. Is Article 1(1)(f) of Directive (EU) 2015/1535 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 September 2015 ‘laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical regulations and of rules on Information Society services (codified text)’ to be interpreted as meaning that a national provision introducing a mandatory, inalienable and non-transferable right to remuneration for authors and performers, in the event that they have assigned their right to authorise or refuse communication to the public of their works or other protected subject-matter by a provider of online content-sharing services, which may be exercised only through compulsory collective rights management, constitutes a ‘technical regulation’, the draft of which is subject to prior notification to the Commission in accordance with the first subparagraph of Article 5(1) of Directive (EU) 2015/1535? If so, is the exception to the notification requirement in Article 7(1)(a) of the same Directive applicable?

5. Must Article 17 of Directive (EU) 2019/790, cited above, read in conjunction with Article 3 of Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 ‘on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society’, be interpreted as precluding national legislation introducing a compulsory remuneration right, inalienable and non-transferable for the benefit of authors and performers, where they have assigned their right to authorise or prohibit communication to the public by a provider of on-line content-sharing services, and providing that that right to remuneration may be exercised only through a compulsory collective rights management mechanism, in particular where the right of making available to the public has already been licensed to the abovementioned provider?

6. Is Article 18 of Directive (EU) 2019/790, cited above, to be interpreted as precluding national legislation introducing a compulsory, inalienable and non-transferable right to remuneration for the benefit of authors and performers in the case where they have assigned their right to authorise or prohibit communication to the public by a provider of online content-sharing services, and providing that that right to remuneration may be exercised only through a compulsory collective rights management mechanism?

7. Is Article 56 TFEU to be interpreted as precluding national legislation which provides, without a transitional period, for a compulsory, inalienable and non-transferable remuneration right in favour of authors and performers, where they have assigned their right to authorise or prohibit communication to the public by a provider of online content-sharing services, and providing that that right to remuneration may be exercised only through a compulsory collective rights management mechanism, in particular where the right of making available to the public has already been licensed to that provider?

8. Is Article 16 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, whether or not read in conjunction with Articles 20 and 21 of that Charter, to be interpreted as precluding national legislation providing for a compulsory, inalienable and non-transferable remuneration right in favour of authors and performers, where they have assigned their right to authorise or prohibit communication to the public by a provider of on-line content-sharing services, and providing that that right to remuneration may be exercised only through a compulsory collective rights management mechanism?

9. Is Article 1(1)(f) of Directive (EU) 2015/1535, cited above, to be interpreted as meaning that a provision of national law establishing a compulsory, inalienable and non-transferable right to remuneration for authors and performers of a sound or audiovisual work, which can only be exercised through compulsory collective rights management, where they have assigned their right to authorise or refuse communication to the public of their works or other protected subject-matter by a streaming service provider, constitutes a ‘technical regulation’, that is to say, a ‘service regulation’, within the meaning of that provision, the draft of which is subject to prior notification to the European Commission pursuant to the first subparagraph of Article 5(1) of that directive, and, where appropriate, is the exception to the notification requirement laid down in Article 7(1)(a) of that directive applicable? For the purposes of this question, ‘streaming service provider’ means a provider of information society services at least one of whose main purposes is to offer for profit a significant quantity of audio or audiovisual works protected by copyright or related rights, the users of which have a right of access to the aforementioned works from a place and at a time of their own choosing, it being understood that these users may not acquire a permanent reproduction of the work consulted and that the provider has editorial responsibility for the offer and organisation of the service, including the organisation, classification and promotion of the works concerned.

10. Must Article 18 of Directive (EU) 2019/790, cited above, read in conjunction with Article 20 of that directive, be interpreted as precluding a provision of national law establishing a mandatory, inalienable and non-transferable right to remuneration for authors and performers of a sound or audiovisual work which may be exercised only through mandatory collective rights management, where they have assigned their right to authorise or refuse the communication to the public of their works or other protected subject-matter by a provider of streaming services within the meaning referred to above, in particular where the right of making available to the public is already licensed to the aforementioned provider?

11. Is Article 56 TFEU to be interpreted as precluding a provision of national law establishing a compulsory, inalienable and non-transferable right to remuneration for authors and performers of a sound or audiovisual work which can be exercised only through compulsory collective rights management, where they have assigned their right to authorise or refuse the communication to the public of their works or other protected subject-matter by a provider of streaming services within the meaning referred to above, in particular where the right of making available to the public is already licensed to that provider?

12. Is Article 16 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union to be interpreted as precluding a provision of national law establishing a compulsory, inalienable and non-transferable right to remuneration for authors and performers of a sound or audiovisual work which can be exercised only through compulsory collective rights management, where they have assigned their right to authorise or refuse the communication to the public of their works or other protected subject-matter by a provider of streaming services within the meaning referred to above, in particular where the right of making available to the public is already licensed to that provider?

13. Are Articles 3 and 5(3) of Directive 2001/29/EC, cited above, to be interpreted as precluding a provision of national law establishing a compulsory, inalienable and non-transferable right to remuneration for authors and performers of a sound or audiovisual work which can be exercised only through compulsory collective rights management, where they have assigned their right to authorise or refuse the communication to the public of their works or other protected subject-matter by a streaming service provider within the meaning of the above, in particular where the right of making available to the public is already licensed to that provider?