Article 85 - Processing and freedom of expression and information
3 preliminary rulingsJudgment of 9 Jul 2026, C-199/24 (Legal Newsdesk Sweden) 
Article 85(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), must be interpreted as precluding Member States from adopting, on the basis of that provision, legislative measures going beyond what is provided for under Article 85(2) of that regulation, in so far as they introduce derogations from certain chapters of that regulation in respect of the processing of personal data for purposes other than journalistic purposes or the purposes of academic, artistic or literary expression, on the ground that those measures are necessary to reconcile the right to protection of personal data with the right to freedom of expression and information.
Article 85(1) of Regulation 2016/679 must be interpreted as precluding the measures adopted by the Member States on its basis from providing, in so far as they give specific expression to the reconciliation which the Member States must carry out between the right to the protection of personal data and the right to freedom of expression and information, that the only legal remedies available to a person who has been convicted of criminal offences, where the personal data on those criminal convictions are made available to the public on the internet, in return for payment, are the possibility to bring criminal proceedings for defamation or to bring an action for compensation for the damage suffered as a result of having been defamed.
Article 85(2) of Regulation 2016/679 must be interpreted as meaning that making available to the public on the internet, in return for payment, public documents consisting of criminal convictions cannot be regarded as processing of personal data carried out for ‘journalistic purposes’, within the meaning of that provision, unless it has as its purpose the disclosure to the public of information, opinions or ideas, in compliance with the ethical rules and codes of conduct of the profession of journalist, after editing or adaptation, or at least in accordance with an editorial policy, and after verification of the factual allegations concerned.
Judgment of 14 Feb 2019, C-345/17 (Buivids)
Article 9 of Directive 95/46 must be interpreted as meaning that factual circumstances such as those of the case in the main proceedings, that is to say, the video recording of police officers in a police station, while a statement is being made, and the publication of that recorded video on a video website, on which users can send, watch and share videos, may constitute a processing of personal data solely for journalistic purposes, within the meaning of that provision, in so far as it is apparent from that video that the sole object of that recording and publication thereof is the disclosure of information, opinions or ideas to the public, this being a matter which it is for the referring court to determine.
Judgment of 16 Dec 2008, C-73/07 (Satakunnan Markkinapörssi and Satamedia)
Article 9 of Directive 95/46 is to be interpreted as meaning that the activities referred to at points (a) to (d) of the first question, relating to data from documents which are in the public domain under national legislation, must be considered as activities involving the processing of personal data carried out ‘solely for journalistic purposes’, within the meaning of that provision, if the sole object of those activities is the disclosure to the public of information, opinions or ideas. Whether that is the case is a matter for the national court to determine.
